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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen has presented the
following questions for review:
I.

Did the court of appeals erroneously apply a harmless

error analysis after finding error in the trial court's partial
directed

verdict

in favor

of Smith's

Management

Corporation

("Smith's")?
A.

Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the

appellate court finds error in a trial court's directed verdict?
B.

If a harmless error analysis is appropriate in erro-

neous directed verdict cases is that analysis appropriate in this
case?
II.

Did the court of appeals err in holding that jury in-

struction number 32 was erroneous but harmless?
III.

Did the court of appeals err in affirming the trial

court's exclusion of evidence?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The court of appeals opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) was issued on
October 29, 1991 and is enclosed as Appendix A. Mrs. Steffensen's
petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991; the denial
was filed on November 20, 1991.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper for this objection in that Petitioner's
brief was filed on December 18, 1991, and this brief was timely
filed within thirty (30) days thereafter as required pursuant to
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Smith's accepts petitioner's statement of the case.

It is

important to note that Mr. Burnett was peacefully apprehended and
that his attempt to escape occurred after apprehension while he
was being taken to the manager's office.

Steffensen v. Smith's,

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO APPLY A
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAD ERRED. MRS. STEFFENSEN FAILED TO SHOULDER HER
BURDEN OF PERSUASION ON APPEAL AND CANNOT MERELY PETITION
THIS COURT FOR A SECOND CHANCE TO MEET THAT BURDEN.
There is no value in remanding a case to the trial court on
the basis of error if there is no likelihood, based upon the evidence, that the verdict of the jury would be other than what it
was.

The court of appeals recognized this basic premise when it

applied a harmless error analysis after finding that the trial
court had erred in granting a partial directed verdict in favor of
Smith's.
A.

IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE THE APPEAL COURT THAT AN ERROR
HAS OCCURRED WITHOUT ALSO PROVING A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT
THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FAVORABLE TO MRS. STEFFENSEN.
This Court has consistently held that where an error is found

on appeal, reversal is only appropriate where there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome to the appellant.

Matter

of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985); Cerritos Trucking
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982); Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259 (Utah 1980).
We may reverse a trial court judgment only
if there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent the error, there would have been a
2

result more favorable to the complaining party.
Kesler at 96 (emphasis added).
cient to reverse a case.

The finding of error is insuffi-

The appellate court must also find that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the complaining party would
have prevailed.

Lee v. Mitchell at 261.

Mrs. Steffensen is mistaken when she claims that a harmless
error analysis is never applied in cases of directed verdicts.
This Court has held that where a directed verdict was erroneous,
the error must be prejudicial and is reversible only where reasonable likelihood of a different outcome has been demonstrated by
the appellant.
Although in passing on a motion for directed
verdict it is not proper for the trial court
to weigh evidence. . . that he did so in this
case did not result in prejudicial error since
the defendants were not entitled to succeed in
any event. . . This Court will not reverse a
trial court judgment merely because there may
have been error; reversal occurs only if the
error is such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would
have been a result more favorable to the
complaining party.
Cerritos v. Utah Venture at 613 (emphasis added).
A careful reading of the directed verdict cases listed by Mrs.
Steffensen indicates that, after finding error in a directed
verdict, the appellate courts reviewed the evidence to determine
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the complaining
party would prevail.

In those cases, the courts did find suffi-

cient evidence of prejudice to support reversal.

However, they

could also have found insufficient likelihood of a different outcome.

This is the harmless error analysis Mrs. Steffensen com-

3

plains of and which the appellate courts routinely, though not
always explicitly, conducts.
It is appropriate for the appeals court to apply a harmless
error analysis in cases where it finds error on the part of the
trial court.

This is true even if the error involves a directed

verdict.
B.

MRS, STEFFENSEN HAD THE BURDEN TO PERSUADE THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE ERRONEOUS DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PREJUDICIAL IN
THAT SHE HAD A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING IF THE
ERROR HAD NOT BEEN MADE.
On appeal, the appellant has the burden of showing not only

the existence of the error, but that the error was prejudicial in
that there was a likelihood of prevailing had the error not been
made. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d
47, 51 (Utah 1974).
a different outcome.

It is insufficient to claim a possibility of
The "likelihood" standard set forth in the

cases discussed in Point I. A. above is a much higher standard.
The trial court reviewed the evidence presented on appeal in
determining whether there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome in favor of Mrs. Steffensen. It found no such likelihood.
[T]he jury must have concluded that either:
(1) the post-apprehension negligence was too
attenuated and remote from the injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2) Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable
superseding proximate cause of the injury. We
cannot see how the jury would have reached a
different conclusion had it been allowed to
consider acts Smith performed, or failed to
perform, prior to apprehending Mr. Burnett.
Accordingly we find it highly unlikely the jury
would have changed its proximate cause decision
had the trial judge submitted to them the issue
of Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's
shoplifting.
Therefore, we find the trial
court's partial directed verdict on the issue
4

of proximate causation to be, at most, harmless
error.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation. 172 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 39 (emphasis added).

Where an appellate court determines on

review that there is no reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome, it is appropriate to find that error to be
harmless.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).

It is clear that the court of appeals conducted the proper
inquiry into the likelihood of a different outcome. Mrs. Steffensen had merely failed to persuade the court on that issue.

It is

inappropriate for this Court to substitute its judgment for that
of the court of appeals in granting a writ of certiorari. The writ
is appropriate only if the court of appeals exceeds or abuses its
discretionary functions, not if a party merely disapproves of the
court's holdings.
Because harmless error analysis is appropriate in cases of
erroneous directed verdicts and because petitioner did not carry
her burden of persuading the court of appeals that she was prejudiced by the error, there is no basis for this Court to review
these issues.

The Court should, therefore, deny the writ as to

point I raised by Mrs. Steffensen.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW RESPECTING FORESEEABILITY IS IN ERROR, MRS. STEFFENSEN HAS
STILL FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE OUTCOME, EITHER AT THE
TRIAL OR APPELLATE LEVEL, WAS LIKELY TO BE IN HER FAVOR
BUT FOR THE ERROR.
Mrs. Steffensen disputes the court of appeals' statement
regarding foreseeability as discussed and the law dealing with that
concept. However, she has failed to do more than raise the impli5

cation that the erroneous jury instruction precluded the possibility of her prevailing at trial.
As discussed in Point I, Mrs. Steffensen had the burden (as
well as the opportunity) to persuade the court of appeals that but
for the erroneous jury instruction she would likely have prevailed
in the trial court.

The court of appeals, in its discussion of

the post-apprehension evidence and the jury's verdict, indicates
the possibility that the jury could have found negligence and
causation but chose not to do so.

A correct jury instruction on

foreseeability would not likely have affected the jury's conclusions as stated by the court of appeals:
[T]he jury must have concluded that either:
(1) the post-apprehension negligence was too
attenuated and remote from the injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2) Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable
superseding proximate cause of the injury.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 36.

Had the jury been given Instruction No. 32 in the form

submitted by Mrs. Steffensen, there is little likelihood that it
would have changed its proximate cause decision.

This is exactly

the holding of the court of appeals.
Mrs. Steffensen argues that the court of appeals has overruled
previous Utah law on the issue of foreseeability.
true.

This is not

The court of appeals stated that "The question of fore-

seeability goes to the issue of negligence. . •"

172 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 40. This is a true, though perhaps incomplete, statement
of the law. The court did not state that foreseeability is not an
issue in proximate cause.

It did not, therefore, overrule exist-

ing case law on the subject.
6

Mrs. Steffensen failed to meet her burden of proof on appeal
and wishes now, before this Court, to re-argue the issue still
without giving any proof of the likelihood of a different outcome.
It is not the purpose of a writ of certiorari to give a disgruntled
party a second chance to conduct its appeal.

See Rule 46 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT MISINTERPRET RULE 704, UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE, IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY.
A.

THE EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY ON THE EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAM
WAS MADE ON THE BASIS OF RELEVANCE AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH RULE 704.
In its brief before the court of appeals, Smith's argued that

the trial court has the discretion to decide whether or not evidence submitted is relevant, probative or confusing, based upon
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, even if presented by an
expert witness.

It is the function of the trial court to balance

the questions of probative value against prejudicial or confusing
effects.

(Appellee's Brief, pages 10-11).

The trial court ex-

cluded the expert's testimony about the training program only after
weighing its relevance and considering its possibility of confusing
the issues for the jury.

(T. 339-340).

Reviewing this material, the court of appeals, without expressly finding error in the exclusion of evidence, determined that
an error in excluding the evidence would be harmless because the
jury found Smith's, negligent. Smith's Management Corporation. 172
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. The most that could have been accomplished
by admitting that testimony would have been to lead the jury to

7

conclude that Smith's was negligent before and after the apprehension.

This is not a significant distinction and clearly does not

give Mrs. Steffensen more than would the verdict of negligence as
entered by the jury.
Mrs. Steffensen had the burden on appeal of demonstrating that
the excluded evidence could have influenced the jury to render a
different verdict on the issue of negligence and that different
verdict would have resulted in a different overall outcome. Anton
v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991).

The outcome on the

issue of negligence would not have been different and Mrs. Steffensen was not prejudiced by the court's choice to exclude the
evidence.

As in other areas on appeal, Mrs. Steffensen simply

failed to meet her burden of proof on the issue of prejudice.
B.

THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ON APPORTIONMENT IS APPROPRIATE AND
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
The issue of apportionment of fault is a matter for the jury.

Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah
1982); Lamkin v. Lvnch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979).

There is

no question that an expert may testify regarding apportionment if
the expert supplies evidence which would assist the jury in making
its determination apportioning fault. This is the type of testimony contemplated by Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence.

However,

though an expert may testify as to the ultimate issues, he or she
may not give testimony amounting to a legal conclusion which, in
effect, tells the jury what to decide rather than assisting the
jury in evaluation of facts. The court of appeals recognized this
distinction in finding that apportionment of fault is an impermissible

legal

conclusion.

Steffensen
8

v.

Smith's

Management

Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. Citing Davidson v. Prince,
813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991) the court noted that a trial court
may properly exclude expert witness testimony which reached a legal
conclusion.
Had the apportionment testimony been admitted, the effective
outcome of the case would not be different.

This is true even if

the jury had found proximate cause and imposed

liability on

Smith's. The liability of joint tort-feasers is joint and several;
therefore, testimony of apportionment of fault is irrelevant as to
the liability of a single defendant as to the plaintiff. Yost v.
State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981). Apportionment establishes
only rights and obligations which the joint tort-feasers have
toward each other.

As to the plaintiff, each defendant would be

liable for the full amount of damages awarded by the jury.
Regardless of the application of Rule 704 or the other rules of
evidence, the exclusion of testimony regarding apportionment did
not prejudice Mrs. Steffensen.
CONCLUSION
The court

of appeals properly applied

a harmless error

analysis to the various errors claimed by Mrs. Steffensen on
appeal.

Mrs. Steffensen failed to meet the burden of proof

required by her to obtain a reversal on the basis of error by
failing to demonstrate prejudice through a showing that it was
likely she would have prevailed had the errors not been committed.
Having failed to meet that burden of proof and not being happy with
the outcome on appeal, she now wishes to have a second chance.
This is not sufficient justification for issuance of a writ of

9

certiorari.

This Court should, therefore, deny Mrs. Steffensen's

opinion.
Respectfully submitted the

day pf January, 1992.

Christopher A.

Tolboe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the

day of January, 1992, I

caused four (4) true and correct copies of the above Objection to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Richard B. McKeown
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Curtis C. Nesset
1312 Colonial Drive
Salt Lake City, UT/
&il'08 , ^
7 7

//

i^i>^

^

iristopher A. Tolboe

10

APPENDIX A

11

Olllllll

36

172 Utah Adv. Rep. 35

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103
S. Ct. at 2332. Here, Buford's prior drug
related history, the circumstances of Rodriguez^ unwitting buy, and the presence of
drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view of
police officers following forced entry under
exigent circumstances, all set forth in the affidavit, provided the magistrate with the required "'substantial basis for ... concluding]'
that probable cause existed." Id. 462 U.S. at
238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct.
725,736(1960)).
In conclusion, we find that based on the
totality of the circumstances presented in the
affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial
basis for finding that probable cause existed
for issuance of the warrant. We therefore
affirm Buford's conviction.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465
(Utah 1990); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 147-48
OJtah App. 1991), cert, denied, _Utah Adv. Rep
(Utah 1991).
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Provo. Utah

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen
was injured in defendant Smith's Management
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's
management. The jury found Smith was negligent, but the negligence was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train
its employees as to the appropriate methods to
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3)
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's frontend manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr.
Burnett walked toward the front of the store,
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might
attempt to leave the store without paying for
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King
manager, and together the two watched Mr.
Burnett from the office area at the front of
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the
front of the store, he noticed the two managers and felt they were watching him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no
longer being watched, he got out of line and
walked quickly toward the door with the
merchandise.
The two managers then confronted Mr.
Burnett and asked him to come with them to
their office. As the three walked toward the
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another
employee at the front of the store, telling her
to call the police. As the group reached the
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke"
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-see if you can stop him," in an effort to
engage the assistance of others. Responding to
the call for help, another employee attempted
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett
dodged this employee, turning in a different
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced" off
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs.
Steffensen, who was standing at the customer
service counter writing a check. The force of
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the
ground, where she struck her head on the tile
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hospital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her
body.
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen commenced
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was
negligent in dealing with Mr. Burnett and that
this negligence caused her injury. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,
defense counsel moved for a partial directed
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to
deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not,
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge
granted the motion and incorporated this
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At the
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted
written interrogatories to the jury. After deliberation, the jury found Smith had acted
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is the
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial
directed verdict on the element of proximate
causation. During the trial, Mrs. Steffensen
proceeded on two theories of negligence. First,
Mrs. Steffensen asserted Smith had been
negligent in failing to train its employees to
use techniques to "deter" Mr. Burnett from
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's
employees negligently failed to utilize these
techniques in dealing with Mr. Burnett.
Second, Mrs. Steffensen claimed Smith was
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop
Mr. Burnett after he broke away and ran.
Mrs. Steffensen argued that both of these acts
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's
customers and ultimately caused her injuries.
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling
that as a matter of law, even if its employees
had been inadequately trained about the need
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence,
such failure was not the proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The trial court
granted Smith's request and instructed the
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be
considered by the jury:1
You have heard testimony regarding
events that occurred prior to the
time of the stop of the shoplifter,
Mr. Burnett.
You are instructed that none of the
actions of the Smith's employees
prior to the stop and detention
proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, you must not take
this testimony into consideration
when deliberating and making your
decision.
A directed verdict is only appropriate when
the court is able to conclude that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be
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determined from the evidence presented.
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). A directed
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing
party, "there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in [the
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod
v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987).
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury
instruction concerning pre-apprehension
evidence was improper because reasonable
minds could differ as to whether a failure to
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting was the
proximate cause of her injuries.
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the
plaintiff to establish four elements: that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that
defendant breached the duty (negligence); that
the breach of the duty was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury; and that there was
in fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d
111, 116 (Utah 1991). Proximate cause is "that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause), produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets
in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury." State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 &
n.2 (Utah 1984). Further, there can be more
than one proximate cause of an injury so long
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in
causing the injury. See Anderson v. Parson
Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128,
467 P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jaques v. Farrimond,
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963).
It is well established that the question of
proximate cause is generally reserved for the
jury. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d
541, 544 (Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co, Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App.
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990). Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation.
This principle is illustrated by several Utah
Supreme Court decisions. In Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983),
the passenger of a jeep brought an action
against a bus company and the jeep driver for
injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The
trial court granted the bus company a directed
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found
the jeep driver should have observed the bus
prior to the accident, they must find, as a
matter of law, that the jeep driver was the sole
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal,
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer
that the bus negligently contributed to the
accident and pointed to allegations that the
bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive out of
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights.
Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme Court agreed
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with the plaintiff and reversed the directed
verdict The Hams court held it improper for
the trial judge to have taken the issue of proximate cause from the jury The court expla
ined "Where the evidence is in dispute inclu
ding the inferences from the evidence, the
issue should be submitted to the jury " Id
Likewise, in Jensen v Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co, 611 P 2d 363
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant
summary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been
injured in an automobile accident The plain
tiff claimed he was unable to see approaching
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because
a van owned by the defendant utility company
negligently blocked his view by remaining in
the intersection, and this was an intervening
proximate cause of the accident On appeal,
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
summary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause The court held that the issue of proxi
mate cause may only be taken from the jury
where reasonable minds could not differ as to
what "was or was not the proximate cause of
the injury " Id at 365 n 4 The court concluded that "ma situation involving independent intervening cause, the primary issue is
one of the foreseeabihty of the subsequent
negligent conduct of a third person, and in
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must
be resolved by the finder of fact Id at 365
(emphasis added)
In Mitchell v Pearson Enterprises, 697 P 2d
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's summary judgment for
defendant on the issue of proximate causation
because the court found no evidence of prox
imate cause and determined that, without
evidence, the issue would have been left to
juror speculation In Mitchell, dependents of a
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful
death action against the hotel after the dece
ased had been unexplainedly murdered in his
hotel room Plaintiffs sought to prove that the
hotel management was negligent in its security
measures and that such negligence proximately
caused the murder On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's
summary judgment for the defendant The
court held that because there was no evidence
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual
connection between the negligent security
measures and the murder The Mitchell court
recognized that the murderer could have
entered the room in a number of ways, many
of which would have had no connection with
the hotel's security measures, including by
invitation of the deceased Because plaintiffs
bore the burden to show defendant's cpnduct
was a "substantial causative factor that led to
the [guest's] death," id at 246, and because
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than
mere speculation as to how the murderer got
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in the room, summary judgment on the issue
of proximate causation was proper
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should
be taken from the jury only where (1) there is
no evidence to establish a causal connection,
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ
on the inferences to be derived from the evi
dence on proximate causation Robertson v
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc , 163 Ariz 539,
789 P 2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc)
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr
Burnett could not have been the proximate
cause of Mrs Steffensen's injury because
there was not an unbroken causal line between
this failure and Mrs Steffensen's injury
Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehending Mr Burnett, Mr Burnett's decision to
run, and Mr Burnett's physical encounter
with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of
law, intervening proximate causes and there
fore broke the chain of causation flowing
from its failure to deter
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent
negligent act may break the chain of causation
and relieve the liability of a prior negligent
actor under the proper circumstances "
Godesky, 690 P 2d at 544 However, if the
subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes
and the prior actor is not absolved of liability
Id The issue is whether the subsequent inter
vening conduct, either criminal or negligent,
was reasonably foreseeable Id at 545, Harris,
671 P 2d at 220 "A superseding cause, suffi
cient to become the proximate cause of the
final result and relieve defendant of liability
for his original negligence, arises only when an
intervening force was unforeseeable and may
be described with the benefit of hindsight, as
extraordinary " Robertson, 789 P 2d at 1047 2
The fact that the final act which produces the
injury is the criminal conduct of a third party
does not preclude the finding that an earlier
negligent act was the proximate cause of
injury if the criminal conduct was, under the
circumstances, reasonably foreseeable Robertson, 789 P 2d at 1047, Mitchell, 697 P 2d at
246
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subseq
uent acts of negligence to break the chain of
causation between an earlier act ot negligence
and the injury Only the unforeseeable acts of
another constitute an intervening proximate
cause See State v Marty, 166 Ariz 233, 801
P 2d 468, 472 (Ct App 1990), People v
Gentry, 738 P 2d 1188, 1190 (Colo 1987), State
v Neher, 52 Wash App 298, 759 P 2d
475, 476 (1988), afVd, 112 Wash 2d 347, 771
P 2d 330 (1989) To hold otherwise would
allow tortfeasors to escape liability by committing additional acts of negligence following
an initial breach of a duty Therefore, Smith's
apprehension of Mr Burnett and the subsequent chase through the store did not break the
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chain of causation.
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter
of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts following
apprehension broke the chain of causation
between Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. Substantial
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith
could have reasonably foreseen a customer
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat and
mouse" with him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen
presented evidence on this theorv of causation.
A closer question is whether any reasonable
juror could conclude that the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn from it show
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety.
During trial, Mr;>. Steffensen presented testimony from security and shoplifting experts
who testified that Smith's employees failed to
use reasonable means to handle Mr. Burnett, a
suspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the
safety of the store's customers. These experts
identified two specific and generally accepted
techniques that retail stores employ when
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith
failed to implement. First, the experts testified
that a retail store should take steps to "deter"
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or
her plan by taking such affirmati\e action as
making direct eye contact with the suspected
shoplifter, approaching the suspected shoplifter and offering assistance, and calling for
security over the public intercom system.
Second, the experts testified that a retail store
should also train its employees to use care
when apprehending a shoplifter. The experts
agreed that employees should not chase or use
force with a shoplifter who becomes violent or
flees. These experts testified that stores
employ, or should employ, such techniques
primarily to protect the safety of their customers and to prevent incidents precisely like the
one which occurred in this case.3 In addition,
Mrs. Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's
employee training manuals which advocated
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters.4 Mr.
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought
Smith's employees were watching while he was
in the store. He went to get in the check out
line and waited there until he believed he was
not being watched. Further, Mrs. Steffensen's
experts testified that approximately five
percent of all shoplifters, when apprehended,
run. They likewise testified that the proper use
of deterrence techniques can reducer this
number by reducing the number of shoplifters
as a whole.
Thus, we are hesitant to uphold the trial
court's ruling that, as a matter of law,
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Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett was not a
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. There was probably sufficient
evidence produced from which a reasonable
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter
was a negligent act,5 as it would have been
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
trained employee that his or her decision to
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
could have led to a customer's injury.
However, this does not end our inquiry. If
the trial court's partial directed verdict was
harmless error, we need not reverse. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 61 (1991); Stare v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the appellant
has the burden of demonstrating an error was
prejudicial-that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120.
Further, in determining whether a trial court's
error was harmful, we must look beyond the
mere fact of error and consider in totality all
the evidence and proceedings below. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah
1983) (erroneous jury instruction not reversible
error when considered in light ot all instructions and evidence). Although normally we
would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous
directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in
this case we cannot ignore the fact that the
jury's verdict would not have differed had the
trial judge not granted Smith's partial directed
verdict.
At trial, Mrs. Steitensen presented substantial evidence of Smith's negligence: the
store's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting, the negligent apprehension and holding
of Mr. Burnett, and the improper pursuit of
Mr. Burnett once he ran for the door. The
trial court's partial directed verdict removed
from the jury's consideration only the portion
of this evidence relating to Smith's actions
before Mr. Burnett's apprehension. In returning a verdict for the defendant on the remaining evidence, the jury found that although
Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did
not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. Therefore, the jury must have concluded
that either: (1) the post-apprehension negligence was too attenuated and remote from the
injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2)
Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable superseding proximate cause of the
injury. We cannot see how the jury would
have reached a different conclusion had it
been allowed to consider acts Smith performed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehending Mr. Burnett. Accordingly, we find it
highly unlikely the jury would have changed
its proximate cause decision had the trial judge
submitted to them the issue of Smith's failure
to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting. Therefore,
we find the trial court's partial directed
verdict on the issue of proximate causation to
be, at most, harmless error.
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II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court
incorrectly stated the law with regard to foreseeability when it instructed the jury concerning her second theory of negligence-the
post-apprehension chase. We review challenges to jury instructions under a "correctness"
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989).
The trial court's jury instruction number
thirty-two charged the jury that:
Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a
customer which the defendant and
its employees could have reasonably
anticipated as the natural consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the particular injury which
did occur. In determining what is
foreseeable, you must determine that
the actions
by Burnett
were
predictable by Smith's employees
and not just a mere possibility.
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction improperly focused on the particular acts of Mr.
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in
general. We agree that the specific identity of
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's
claim because any error committed by the trial
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989).
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue
of negligence, and the jury found Smith negligent. Therefore, any error in defining foreseeability did not affect the jury's verdict.
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testifying about Smith's employee training practices
as they related to the way its employees handle
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of
expert testimony, are reviewed under a deferential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded
evidence could have influenced the jury to
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas,
806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991).
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A. Testimony On Employee Training
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court
should have admitted expert testimony concerning Smith's failure to adequately train its
employees regarding the proper handling of
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr.
Burnett could not have been the proximate
cause of the injury, and therefore the testimony was irrelevant.
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue
relating to shoplifter "deterrence" mandates a
finding that if this ruling was error, the error
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of
any training evidence relating to Smith's
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also harmless as the jury found Smith negligent in its
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett.
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her
expert witness should have been allowed to
render an opinion concerning the relative fault
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the
trial court's ruling was correct because the
apportionment of fault requires the expert to
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmissible under Utah law. We agree with Smith
that the apportionment of fault requires a
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determination should be reserved for the jury.
This court recently considered the question
of what expert opinions are permissible as
going to the "ultimate issue," 6 and what expert
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclusions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In
Davidson, we held the trial court properly
excluded an expert opinion which concluded
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so,
we stated that "[questions which allow a
witness to simply tell a jury what result to
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A
witness may testify as to the defendant's
actions, including whether the defendant acted
with care; however, the witness may not consider all the facts and render a final legal
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault
between parties to be exactly this type of
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
regarding the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct.
CONCLUSION
In summary, even if the trial judge improperly invaded the province of the jury by
granting Smith a partial directed verdict on the
issue of proximate causation, such error was
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's
subsequent negligent acts were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability"
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for the jury was rendered harmless by the
jury's finding that Smith was negligent.
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded
expert testimony which would have improperly
rendered a legal conclusion as to the proportion of fault between Smith and Mr. Burnett.
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for
defendant.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Although the trial judge both granted a directed
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict.
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an
element of a cause of action, and takes such determination from the purview of the jury-as was
done here. The Utah Supreme Court characterized
the same action of a trial judge as a directed verdict
in Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 219
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial judge
instructed the jury that if they found that the defendant jeep driver should have observed the bus,
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision, thereby precluding liability stemming from
the bus driver's actions, Id. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such. The
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable
from the ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the
sufficiency of the evidence).
2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117
(Utah App. 1990)(in wrongful death action, trial
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of
patient's worsening condition was not proximate
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence).
3. Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques-deterrence and refraining from using force or
chasing the shoplifter-are valid security methods.
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's
employees had been adequately trained in these
procedures and properly followed the procedures
during the Burnett shoplifting incident.
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in handling shoplifters:
Make sure that employees on the sales
floor are greeting and making eye
contact with customers, especially those
who are acting suspiciously. Make use
of the intercom system by calling for
security from time to time. Very effective tool, it gives the potential shoplifter
an uneasy feeling that security is in the r
store.

5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding
Smith owed Mrs Steffensen a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the criminal
acts of third parties was correct. Since trial, the
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shopowner's duty to protect customers from the criminal
acts of third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In Dwiggins, the
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating landowners
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of
third parties where such acts are reasonably foreseeable. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins is
distinguishable because the store in question was the
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's
chain. Further, the fact that Smith's employee
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters
demonstrates Smith did, in fact, foresee such criminal acts. Therefore, we believe the trial judge properly found that because customer injury from
shoplifters was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with
shoplifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744
P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987)(store owner had a
duty to take reasonable security measures to protect
customers where store had been subject of armed
robbery ten times in past three years)(relied on by
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n.l).
6. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1991).

Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its
employees regarding the importance of customer
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safety in handling shoplifters:
Our company policy is that no employee
is to take any action in the apprehension
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to
himself, to other employees, or to customers. The most important thing to
remember about apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not want anyone
injured. There is nothing in the store
that is worth a person getting hurt for.
Use common sense, if the situation
can't be properly controlled let the
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license
number.

